Ruby Urgent v. United States Marshals by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-11-2017 
Ruby Urgent v. United States Marshals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Ruby Urgent v. United States Marshals" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 774. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/774 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 16-1765 
__________ 
 
RUBY URGENT, 
                                 Appellant  
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 1-13-cv-00091) 
District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
 
Argued May 10, 2017 
 
BEFORE:  AMBRO, COWEN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 11, 2017) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Ruby Urgent, an applicant for a Court Security Officer (CSO) position, sued the 
United States Marshals Service alleging that it violated Title VII.  She contends her 
application was rejected by the Marshals in retaliation for a discrimination claim Urgent’s 
friend filed five years prior.  Because we conclude that Urgent was not an applicant for 
employment in the federal government, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Marshals.1 
 MVM, Inc., a private contractor, supplied CSOs to work in federal courthouses.  
Urgent submitted her application to MVM for a CSO position in 2011.  MVM 
interviewed Urgent, evaluated her references, and determined she met the minimum 
requirements for the position.  MVM then gave her application to the Marshals so they 
could conduct a background investigation.  Deputy Marshal Darby Kirby was assigned 
this task in August 2011.   
 Urgent told the Marshals that she lived alone.  But the investigation revealed that 
Diedre Finch2 and Finch’s son lived with Urgent.  Finch was a former Lead Court 
Security Officer (LCSO) who was fired by MVM five years prior.  Kirby included all of 
this information in the “Special Factors” section of her investigation report. 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We give plenary review to a district 
court's order granting summary judgment, and we apply the same standard that the 
district court applied.  Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University, 851 F.3d 249, 
256 (3d Cir,. 2017).   
2 She was formerly known as Diedre Valmont. 
4 
 
 The deadline for completing the investigation was October 14, 2011.  On October 
5, 2011, Kirby told Urgent she needed to sign an additional authorization so the Marshals 
could review an internal affairs file from the Virgin Islands Police Department, Urgent’s 
former employer.  Urgent complied with this request on October 11 but the Police 
Department did not transmit the file in time to meet the October 14 deadline.  On October 
14, Kirby submitted Urgent’s background investigation report, though incomplete, to the 
Marshals’ Judicial Security Inspector, Daniel Winfield. 
 Winfield mistakenly believed that Urgent had been uncooperative about supplying 
authorizations and errantly concluded that she caused the incomplete investigation.  He 
recommended to his supervisor, Reggie Bradshaw, that the deadline for completing 
Urgent’s report should not be extended.  This foreclosed Kirby’s attempt to supplement 
the report two weeks later, after she received the internal affairs file.  On November 15, 
2011, LCSO Gregory Evans notified Urgent that she did not pass the background 
investigation and was disqualified for the CSO position.  A former CSO subsequently 
told her that she was not hired because she lied on her application about living alone.  
Urgent maintains she did not lie and that it was a misunderstanding.   
 Urgent filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint with the Department of 
Justice alleging age and sexual discrimination.  Urgent also checked a box on the EEO 
complaint indicating she was asserting a reprisal claim.  She then retracted it explaining 
she did not understand the meaning of “reprisal.”  But later Urgent asserted to an EEO 
investigator that the Marshals intentionally failed her on her background investigation to 
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retaliate against Finch who, Urgent said, had filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit against 
MVM five years prior. 
 The Agency concluded in a final decision on May 21, 2013, that the evidence did 
not support Urgent’s allegations of age and sexual discrimination.  The Agency noted her 
remarks about Finch and Finch’s lawsuit.  But it also commented in its analysis that even 
if she was right—that the Marshals refused to hire her because of her friendship with 
Finch—she did not proffer enough evidence to show their relationship fell within a 
protected category. 
 Urgent filed this case with the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, 3 
focusing only on her claim that the Marshals retaliated against her.4  She maintained that 
she was forced to “pass through the gauntlet” of the Marshals’ background check, giving 
them control over the hiring and firing of CSOs.  She contended that this control was 
dispositive evidence that she was an applicant for federal employment.  The District 
Court acknowledged the unique circumstance here:  a federal agency conducting 
background checks on behalf of a private employer.  But it reasoned that, even assuming 
the Marshals did control aspects of the hiring process, the rest of the record—including 
Urgent’s own admissions about MVM being her employer—showed she was an applicant 
                                              
3 “All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in 
executive agencies . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. 
4 The Marshals assert that Urgent did not exhaust her retaliation claim because she 
retracted her EEO reprisal claim.  However, the Agency comments in its final decision on 
Urgent’s references to Finch, and its inclusion of this information in its analysis indicates 
it was, at a minimum, aware of the gist of her retaliation claim.  Therefore, we do not 
regard this claim as waived. 
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to be an employee of MVM, not the Marshals.5  The District Court decided section 
2000e-16 did not authorize this lawsuit.   
 Urgent now appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the Marshals.  She reiterates the arguments she made before the District Court and says it 
erred by restricting section 2000e-16 to only those who “literally” applied to a federal 
agency.  We disagree with Urgent’s characterization of the District Court’s decision.  
But, even if we assume—solely for purposes of summary judgment—that the background 
check gives the Marshals complete control of the decision to hire or reject CSO 
applicants, we still cannot find any reason to disturb the judgment of the District Court.   
 Urgent premises her claim on the fact that she was only an applicant.  Because of 
this, she argues, the Title VII employer analysis should be collapsed to look only at who 
has the power to hire and fire CSOs.  We are not persuaded.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214 
(3d Cir. 2015).  In Title VII claims, we look to the factors set out in Darden, which 
generally focus on ‘“the level of control the defendant[s] . . . exerted over the plaintiff.”’  
Covington v. International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 
119 (3d Cir. 2013).  This includes an inquiry into ‘“which entity paid [the employees’] 
salaries, hired and fired them, and had control over their daily employment activities.”’  
                                              
5The District Court highlighted Urgent’s concession that she submitted her application to 
MVM.  The District Court also pointed out that Urgent signed a document as part of her 
application acknowledging that MVM would hire her “to work on their behalf” and that 
she could not “at any time represent [herself] as an employee of [the Marshals].” 
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Faush, 808 F.3d at 214 (quoting Covington, 710 F.3d at 119).  No one factor in the 
Darden analysis is decisive.  Darden, 503 U.S. at 324.   
 Here the Marshals established that they do not pay the CSOs and that a site 
supervisor employed by the private contractor performs daily supervision of the CSOs at 
the courthouse.  Urgent conceded in her complaint, in her briefing, and at oral argument 
that MVM pays, trains, and provides daily supervision of the CSOs.6  Therefore, the 
undisputed evidence shows that two of three central factors in the Darden analysis do not 
support a conclusion that the Marshals could be considered an employer.  On this record, 
we are convinced that MVM, not the Marshals, is Urgent’s sole employer for purposes of 
Title VII.7 
 Because we conclude that Urgent was an applicant to be an employee of a private 
contractor, rather than an employee of the federal government, we must rule that section 
2000e-16 does not authorize Urgent to bring this lawsuit.  Accordingly, we will not reach 
the merits of her discrimination claim. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
6 In her reply brief, Urgent notes that the Marshals established employment standards for 
CSOs, monitors these standards, and can fire CSOs if they do not meet those standards.  
Even if we accept, for purposes of summary judgment, that this is a proper 
characterization of the Marshals’ efforts and authority, this evidence is still insufficient to 
ground a reasonable inference that the Marshals exercised daily or routine supervision 
over the CSOs. 
7 With this record, our assessment would not change even if we agreed with Urgent that a 
joint-employer analysis is appropriate here.  See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 173 
(3d Cir. 2007).  
